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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHLEEN R. BARNES, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
STEVEN LYN BARNES, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals is granted jurisdiction of this 
matter pursuant to Rules 3(a) and 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure and Section 78-2a-3 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the Third Judicial District Court1s 
award, after trial of the matter, of custody to the 
Plaintiff/Appellee, of alimony to the Plaintiff/Appellee and of the 
division of the Defendant/Appellant's retirement monies. The 
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick presided at the divorce trial held 
January 30, 1992 and January 31, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. The trial court awarded permanent custody of the parties' 
three (3) minor children to the Plaintiff/Appellee. The 
Defendant/Appellant contends the award of custody was not based 
upon the evidence presented at trial, is contrary to the best 
interests of the minor children, and is not supported by adequate 
findings of fact. The standard of review to be followed by the 
1 
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Court of Appeals is a determination that the best interests of the 
child will be met by the custody award and a determination that the 
award of custody is not a clesar abuse of discretion. Section 
30-3-10 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, Paryzek v. 
Paryzek. 776 P. 2d 78 ( Utah App. 1989) and Cumminas v. Cumminas. 
175 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 ( Utah 1991) discuss the standard of review 
in custody matters. 
2. The trial court awarded the Plaintiff/Appellee permanent 
alimony in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500.00) per month. 
The Defendant/Appellant contends the award of alimony to the 
Plaintiff/Appellant is erroneous as the Plaintiff/Appellee did not 
demonstrate any genuine need for alimony. Moreover, the award of 
alimony to the Plaintiff/Appellee made it impossible for the 
Defendant/Appellant to meet basic living expenses for himself. As 
confirmed in Chambers v. Chambers, 198 Utah Adv. Rep. ( Utah 
October 21, 1992) and Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d. 818 ( Utah 
App. 1992) the appellate standard of review of alimony 
determinations is whether or not the award constituted a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion. 
3. The trial court, without justification, essentially 
reversed its division of the Defendant/Appellant's retirement 
monies after ruling on post-divorce motions. The division of the 
retirement monies failed to take into account the allowable 
expenditures from retirement monies and erroneously calculated the 
amount of monies in existence on the date of the divorce trial. The 
appellate court reviews the trial Court's property division to 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
determine whether there was substantial and prejudicial error, 
whether the evidence clearly preponderates against the findings or 
if there was a clear abuse of discretion. Watson v. Watson, 194 
Utah Adv. Rep. 42 ( Utah App. , August 24, 1992), Howell v. Howell, 
806 P. 2d 1209 ( Utah App. 1991) and Haumont v. Haumont, 793 P. 2d 
421 ( Utah App. 1990). 
4. The trial court refused to allow the children and several 
witnesses called by the Defendant/Appellant to testify regarding 
the children's preference for permanent custody. The Court 
impermissibly excluded evidence impacting on the children's best 
interests. Identification of a child's preference for custody and 
the consequences for not doing so which constitute a clear abuse of 
discretion are identified in Section 30-3-10 of the Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended, Paryzek v. Paryzek, supra, and 
Hutchison v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38 ( Utah 1982). 
5. The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law 
were insufficient to support its resolution of custody, alimony, 
and the division of the Defendant/Appellant's retirement monies. If 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law are clearly erroneous 
they can not support a challenge upon appeal. Roberts v. Roberts, 
835 P.2d 193 ( Utah App. 1992), Woodward v. Fazio, 175 Utah Adv. 
Rep. ( Utah App. Dec. 1991) and Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
6. The trial court refused to grant the Defendant/Appellant a 
new trial and refused to grant a hearing to resolve issues which 
were not raised at trial. The rulings of the Court were arbitrary, 
3 
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prejudicial and partially necessitated this appeal. The failure to 
grant the Defendant/Appellant's post-divorce motions including the 
Motion for New Trial were a clear abuse of discretion. Rule 59(6) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Watson v. Watsonf supra. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a final Order of the Third Judicial 
District Court resolving issues of custody, alimony, and the 
division of retirement monies. The Defendant/Appellant filed post-
trial motions for a new trial to stay the trial Court's decision 
pending completion of the appellate process, and to reconsider 
stated matters. Appeal is taken from the Court's denial of all the 
Defendant/Appellant's post-trial motions. 
1. The parties were married on September 16, 1972. 
2. Three (3) children, Jamie Nicole, whose date of birth is 
July 26, 1976, Adam Matthew, whose date of birth is March 29, 1979, 
and Jennifer Morgan, whose date of birth is November 20, 1982 were 
born of this marriage. 
3. The parties reconciled after an eighteen month separation 
which terminated approximately two years prior to the final 
separation, which culminated in the dissolution of this marriage. 
During the initial separation, the Defendant/Appellant was the 
primary caretaker for the peirties' minor children. 
4. Commissioner Peuler interviewed Jamie and Jennifer after 
the hearing on the Plaintiff/Appellee's Order to Show Cause. 
Commissioner Peuler's Minute Entry, dated January 22, 1991, awarded 
the Defendant/Appellant temporary custody of the parties' minor 
1 
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children because he had been their primary caretaker during the 
parties' previous extended separation. 
5. The Defendant/Appellant remained in the marital home and 
provided the primary care for the minor children for over a year 
until the Court awarded custody of the children to the 
Plaintiff/Appellee and ordered him to vacate the marital home. The 
Plaintiff/Appellee provided limited supervision and care for the 
minor children before school and after school. 
6. The Court selected Dr. Donald Strassberg to perform a 
custody evaluation. Dr. Strassberg determined that both parties 
would be fine custodians for the minor children but that custody 
should be awarded to the Plaintiff/Appellee. 
7. The Court initially, in the oral ruling, rendered at the 
conclusion of the trial, ordered the parties divide the retirement 
monies the Defendant/Appellant had at the time of the separation 
after making deductions for expenditures made by the 
Defendant/Appellant during the parties' separation for marital 
obligations. 
8. The Court awarded the Plaintiff/Appellee permanent 
alimony in the amount of five hundred dollars ($500.00) per month. 
9. The Defendant/Appellant filed a Motion for New Trial on 
February 13, 1992. The rationale for the Motion for New Trial was 
the Defendant/Appellant's belief the Court's decision on the issues 
of custody and alimony were legally deficient and not supported by 
the evidence presented at the trial. The Court issued a Minute 
Entry on February 20, 1992 denying the Defendant/Appellant's Motion 
5. 
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for New Trial. 
10. The parties could not agree upon the dollar amount of the 
retirement monies to be divided between the parties. 
Consequently, the Defendant/Appellant filed a Motion for 
Reconsideration of Unresolved Issues on February 24, 1992. On 
March 3, 1992, the Court issued a Minute Entry denying the 
Defendant/Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration of Unresolved 
Issues. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Each parent acknowledge the Defendant/Appellant was the 
primary caretaker of the parties7 three (3) children during each of 
the parties' protracted separations. The children thrived in the 
Defendant/Appellant's care. 
The Plaintiff/Appellee provided driving service back and forth 
from school during the parties' second separation. She even 
testified at trial that she did fewer labors to benefit and assist 
the minor children during the second separation than during the 
time of the first separation, and that she was in the martial home 
more during the first separation than during the second separation. 
(T.31) 
The Plaintiff/Appellee did very little to exercise her full 
visitation rights. She testified that she generally only elected 
to see the children for a few hours one day each weekend and that 
she had the children spend the entire weekend with her only once 
during the entire second separation. (1.30,1.31, T.59) 
The trial Court ignored the evidence at trial regarding the 
& 
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parenting capabilities of both parents, and without compelling 
reasons to do so changed the stable, competent custodial situation 
of the children. 
The Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law neither 
accurately reflect the testimony given at trial nor give more than 
conclusionary rationale, most of which are not supported by the 
evidence for the Court's rulings on the issues of custody, alimony 
and the division of the Defendant/Appellant's retirement monies. 
The Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are legally 
deficient. 
The Plaintiff/Appellee worked part-time during the majority of 
the second separation. There was absolutely no dispute that she 
could have worked full time for her employer. (T.6, T.49) The 
Defendant/Appellant worked full time with little opportunity for 
overtime. The trial Court awarded permanent alimony to the 
Plaintiff/Appellee without requiring her to maximize her own 
earning potential and in complete disregard of the financial 
consequences to the Defendant/Appellant. The Defendant/Appellant 
is left without sufficient monies to meet basic living expenses 
after payment of his child support and alimony obligations. 
The parties7 two oldest children had clear preferences 
regarding their permanent custody. The trial Court refused to hear 
any testimony from any witness or from the children themselves 
regarding their preferences for custody. These children, 16 years 
and 13 years, respectively are capable of voicing a thoughtful and 
wise choice of custodial parent, and believed that they had 
7 
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sufficient reasons to prefer the custody of the 
Defendant/Appellant, The two older children hoped they would be 
able to speak to Judge Frederick about their choice of custody 
outside the presence of their parents. When talking with the 
children, Judge Frederick refused to ask either of the older 
children if they had any opinion or preference regarding custody. 
Apparently, he also did not introduce any general topic which would 
allow the older children to take the initiative to articulate their 
preferences. (T.192, T.193) 
The failure of the trial Court to ascertain, much less place 
any reliance upon the older children's considered position 
regarding custody, was contrary to a full examination of the 
children's best interests. The exclusion of competent testimony 
clearly precluded a determination of custody designed to satisfy 
the needs of the children. 
The Defendant/Appellant received the monies in his retirement 
account when there was a buy out of his employer. The parties made 
expenditures of these marital monies during the period of their 
reconciliation. There was essentially no dispute about the amount 
of monies in existence at the time of the parties' separation. 
(T.18, T.140) The Defendant/Appellant further expended retirement 
funds for marital and non-mcirital obligations during the parties' 
separation. The trial Court ordered the parties' to divide equally 
the retirement funds in existence at the time of the parties' 
separation after making deductions for the expenditures to pay the 
marital obligations. (T.200, T.201) 
& 
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Counsel for the Plaintiff/Appellee drafted proposed Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law which indicated an amount the 
Defendant/Appellant considered inaccurate. The trial Court denied 
the objection to the erroneous provisions, and improperly modified 
and upwardly adjusted the amount of retirement monies to be divided 
between the parties. On February 19, 1992, the Defendant/Appellant 
filed his Motion for Reconsideration of Unresolved Issues. The 
trial Court issued a Minute Entry dated March 3, 1992, which denied 
the Defendant/Appellant's Motion for Reconsideration of Unresolved 
Issues. 
The trial Court ordered the division of the larger, initial 
amount of retirement funds received by the Defendant/Appellant 
rather than the funds existing at the time of the parties' 
separation minus allowable deductions for the payment of marital 
expenditures at the date of trial. The Court executed Amended 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law addressing this issue which 
are not supported by the evidence. The improper division of the 
total amount of monies received initially by the Defendant/ 
Appellant is contrary to the evidence presented at trial and is 
tantamount to an unjust enrichment to the Plaintiff/Appellee. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING CUSTODY OF THE PARTIES' 
MINOR CHILDREN TO PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE 
A. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE 
PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE'S MORALS 
Section 30-3-10 of the Utah Code annotated 1953, as amended, 
clearly mandates the trial Court evaluate each parent's morals as 
SL 
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a significant factor in considering an award of permanent custody. 
The Plaintiff/Appellee testified at trial that she had 
intimate affairs with men during each of the parties1 separation. 
(T.54, T.57# T.60, T.69, T.70, T.72) The termination of one, 
probably two, of these relationships caused the Plaintiff/Appellee 
to contemplate suicide. (T.56, T.57, T.70# T.155, T.156, Ex 5) 
The Defendant/Appellant testified that he believed it was 
categorically wrong for a party to be intimate with another before 
one's divorce was final. (T.122) He testified that he believed the 
Plaintiff/Appellee's morals would preclude her from teaching good 
morals to their children, and setting a good example for the 
children. He believed her extramartial relationships often caused 
her to make poor decisions, such as introducing the children of the 
parties to her male friends, leaving the children with her 
boyfriends or neglecting them to spend weekends with her boyfriend. 
(T.60, T.122, T.123, T.126, T.129, T.160) 
The Utah Court of Appeals has determined that a parents' 
extramarital affairs do have a bearing upon that parent's fitness 
to be awarded custody. In Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172 (Utah 
App. 1990) at page 1177 the Appellate Court stated: 
"Nor do we find that the trial Court abused its 
discretion in considering Rachelle's sexual conduct in 
making its custody decision. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10(1) 
(1989) provides that in custody determinations pursuant 
to divorce, the trial Court "shall consider the best 
interests of the child and the past conduct and 
demonstrated moral standards of each of the parties." 
The statute has been construed to mean that parental 
moral character is but one of numerous factors that the 
trial Court may consider in determining the child's best 
interest. See Santerson v. Tryon. 739 P. 2d 623, 627 
(Utah 1987.)" 
10 
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The Utah Courts do not appear to be willing to deviate from 
consideration of a party's extramarital affairs when deliberating 
the issue of permanent custody. In Cumminas v. Cumminas, 175 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 23, 26 (Utah Nov. 1991), the Appellate Court upheld the 
lower court's award of custody to the father partially because of 
emotional harm her children suffered because of her relationships 
with men. 
There was never any indication from any source that the 
Defendant/Appellant had a single extramarital affair. There was 
never any suggestion that the loss of a lover would cause the 
Defendant/Appellant to contemplate suicide and desert his children. 
There was never any testimony to indicate the Defendant/Appellant 
needed to validate himself by engaging in extramarital affairs or 
that he had ever made his children secondary to an extramarital 
partner. Not only did the Plaintiff/Appellee choose to spend 
weekends with her boyfriend over the time she was scheduled to 
spend the time with her children, but as she reported to Dr. 
Strassberg she discussed her extramarital affairs with her oldest 
child, Jamie Nicole. She believed the sharing of personal, 
intimate matters enabled her to be more "like friends" with Jamie 
than mother/daughter. (Custody Evaluation of Dr. Strassberg) 
The trial Court, in an absolute disregard of its discretion, 
failed to consider the Plaintiff/Appellee's extramarital affairs 
over parenting responsibilities, her abdication of traditional 
mother/daughter interaction in order to be a friend rather than 
parent to her oldest daughter, and the very definite negative 
11 
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impact of her extramarital affairs upon her children. Clearly, 
there was a noted and substantial difference between the morals of 
these parents. It is inconceivable that the trial Court believed 
the parent with less exemplary morals, which she allowed to impact 
in decisions regarding her children should be awarded custody of 
the minor children. The trial Court's award of custody to the 
Plaintiff/Appellee should be reversed. 
Dr. Strassberg testified that the Defendant/Appellant was 
concerned about the Plaintiff/Appellee's relationship with her 
biological father. (T.96) The evaluation also testified that the 
Plaintiff/Appellee eventually terminated all contact with her 
natural father when he indicated he wanted more intimacy with her. 
(T.91, T.92) 
Although there is no proof that the Plaintiff/Appellee ever 
engaged in an incestuous relationship with her biological father, 
there is every indication from parties who knew the 
Plaintiff/Appellee and her father very well and even from the 
Plaintiff/Appellee herself that their relationship was not typical 
of other father/daughter relationships and had some sexual 
components. She maintained this relationship as an adult by her 
voluntary election. The Plaintiff/Appellee is, in the pictures 
introduced into evidence and in the descriptions given by others, 
seen to be willingly engaging in questionable physical contact with 
her father. 
It is hard to fathom that the Plaintiff/Appellee's judgment 
would be deemed appropriate, wise, prudent or insightful in light 
12 
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of her relationships with boyfriends during her marriage to 
Defendant/Appellant or her father. Antithetically, the 
Defendant/Appellant's morals and ability to form healthy 
relationships was never questioned or challenged. It was clearly 
an abuse of discretion for the trial Court to deprive the parent 
who could provide mature, appropriate, morally defensible guidance 
in the formation of future relationships of custody. The award of 
custody to the Plaintiff/Appellee should be reversed. 
The Plaintiff/Appellee demonstrated that she would use deceit 
to ensure her own happiness even if it meant detrimental 
consequences to her children. The Plaintiff/Appellee removed 
checks remitted by the Defendant/Appellant's insurance carrier, 
which were made payable to the Defendant/Appellant, from the 
marital home. Although these checks were issued as payments to 
Jamie's health insurance providers, the Plaintiff/Appellee forged 
the Defendant/Appellant's names to the checks and utilized the 
funds for her own personal needs. (T.51, T.138, T.139) The 
Plaintiff/Appellee apparently believed it was acceptable and 
appropriate for her to convert monies that were not her own to her 
own wants rather than to work to pay her own bills. 
The Plaintiff/Appellee went to the marital home when the 
Defendant/Appellant was not home and removed the parties' camper 
trailer. She subsequently sold the camper trailer and kept the 
sales proceeds for her own use. (T.135, T.136) The sale of the 
camper trailer eliminated the pleasure the children experienced in 
their family camping trips. (T.136) Again, the Plaintiff/Appellee 
13 
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apparently believed it was appropriate and acceptable for her to 
dispose of an asset enjoyed by the entire family and retain the 
monies than to work to pay her own bills. 
Evidence at trial, even from the Plaintiff/Appellee, 
illustrated the questionable integrity of the Plaintiff/Appellee. 
There is no plausible argument which could refute the contention 
that a person's integrity is a component of their moral fitness. 
Although Judge Frederick did not condone the Plaintiff/Appellee's 
taking and utilization of assets for her personal needs, he did not 
make any correlation between the Plaintiff/Appellee's lack of 
integrity, her willingness to put her needs before the needs of her 
children, and the statuary requirements of § 30-3-10(1) of the Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. The Court's failure to consider 
the integrity of the Plaintiff/Appellee was clearly violation of 
the mandates of the applicable statutes and controlling case law 
such as Merriam, supra. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY IGNORED THE EXCELLENT 
TEMPORARY CUSTODY AWARD. 
The Defendant/Appellant was unarguably the primary caretaker 
for the parties' minor children nearly thirty months of the fifty-
four months which preceded the trial of this matter. He was the 
custodial parent and primary caretaker during the eighteen months 
of the parties' first separation and the twelve months of the 
parties' final separation. (T.30, T.54, T.117, T.118, T.123) Dr. 
Strassberg did not identify any harm or ill effects to the children 
during the extensive times spent in the custody of their father. 
Rather, the home maintained by the Defendant/Appellant and the 
14 
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environment therein seemed to be stable and structured to 
successfully meet the needs of all the children. 
The stability of a temporary custody arrangement is one which 
should not be changed except for compelling reasons. In Paryzek v. 
Paryzek, 776 P.2d 78 (Utah App. 1989) at pages 81 and 82, the Court 
stated: 
"The overriding consideration in child custody 
determinations is the child's best interests. Hutchison 
v. Hutchison, 649 P.2d 38, 40 (Utah 1982). There are 
several factors to be considered by the trial court in 
awarding custody, some of which concern the child's 
specific needs and others which relate to the parents' 
characteristics. Id. at 41. However, providing a 
stable home for a child and avoiding "ping pong" custody 
awards are critical factors in custody disputes. Hoaae 
v. Hoaae. 649 P. 2d 51, 53-54 (Utah 1982). There is a 
"general interest in continuing previously determined 
custody arrangements where the child is happy and well 
adjusted." Hutchinson, 649 P.29 at 41. This interest in 
stability has been the basis for requiring a substantial 
change of circumstances as a precondition for reexamining 
permanent custody awards. Id.; Kramer v. Kramer, 738 
P.2d 624, 626 (Utah 1987); Fullmer v. Fullmer, 761 P.2d 
942, 946 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Recently, however, in 
Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, (1989), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that the strict change of circumstances 
requirements would not always apply in custody 
modification proceedings. Nonetheless, the court 
emphasized the importance of relative permanence in 
custody orders: 
[I]f an existing custody arrangement is not 
inimical to the child, the continuity and 
stability of the arrangement are factors to be 
weighted in determining a child's best 
interests. What particular weight to be 
accorded those factors in a given case must 
depend on the duration of the initial custody 
arrangement, the age of the child, the nature 
of the relationship that has developed between 
the child and the custodial and noncustodial 
parents, and how well the child is thriving 
physically, mentally, and emotionally. A very 
short custody arrangement of a few months, 
even if nurturing to some extent, is not 
entitled to as much weight as a similar 
arrangement of substantial duration. 
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Id, at 604. See also Mauahan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Notably, Elmer did not identify 
the temporary versus permanent nature of the "initial 
custody award" as one of the factors to be considered in 
deciding how much weight to give "continuity and 
stability." The Elmer decision emphasized that the 
paramount consideration must be promoting the child's 
best interests, and it is irrelevant from the child's 
perspective, how, as a legal matter, the existing 
arrangement came about. 
Other Utah Supreme Court cases have similarly held that 
stability is a fundamental consideration in original 
custody awards as well as in subsequent modifications. 
In Pusey v. Pusev, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 1986), the 
court stated that decisive factors in child custody 
determinations should be function-related, and include 
the "identity of [the] primary caretaker during the 
marriage." However, Pusey also states that another 
factor is considered in the "identity of the parent with 
whom the child has spent most of his or her time pending 
custody determination if that period is lengthy." Id. 
in Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 1988), the father 
had custody of the child for over a year prior to trial 
on the issue of a permanent custody award. The trial 
court considered various factors, including that the 
father had provided a stable environment and had been the 
primary caretaker during the interim period. The Utah 
Supreme Court affirmed the custody award to the father, 
and stated that lf[i.]n considering competing claims to 
custody between fit parents under the 'best interests of 
the child' standard, considerable weight should be given 
to which parent has been the child's primary caretaker" 
prior to the divorce. Davis, 749 P.2d at 648 (emphasis 
added)• 
The Defendant/Appellant demonstrated not only the desire but 
the actual ability to place his children's needs before his, to 
make sacrifices of time and assets for his children and to provide 
a stable, secure environment and home for his children during the 
disruptions and separations caused by their parents' marital 
discord. (T.151, T.152) 
After Paryzek, supra. there have been a plethora of cases 
which have affirmed the desire to maintain temporary custody 
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arrangements if they have been functional, have met the needs of 
the children and will continue to meet the best interests of the 
children. Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah App. 1990), Thronson v. 
Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1991), Cumminas v. Cumminasr 175 
Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah Nov. 1991). The Utah Court of Appeals has 
even stated that as a matter of law permanent custody must be 
awarded to the party who was the primary caretaker during the 
pendency of the action. In Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172 (Utah 
App. 1990) at pages 1177 and 1178 the Court stated: 
"In Paryzek v. Paryzek. 776 P.2d 78 (1989), this 
court held that in custody decisions, a trial court must, 
because of the child's need for stability, consider the 
nature and duration of pre-existing custody arrangements. 
Id. at 82. We also indicated that when the call is 
otherwise close, this consideration may warrant awarding 
permanent custody, as a matter of law, to the party who 
was primary caretaker during the pendency of the divorce. 
Id. at 83-84. In Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647 (Utah 
1988), the Utah Supreme Court stated that in a custody 
dispute between fit parents, "considerable weight" should 
be given to the identity of the primary caretaker. Id. 
at 648. See also Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117, 120 (Utah 
1986) (identity of parent with whom child has spent most 
time pending divorce is fact to consider in custody 
decision." 
There is no dispute that the Defendant/Appellant nurtured the 
children and met their emotional and physical needs during each of 
the parties' separations. 
Dr. Strassberg testified that the Defendant/Appellant was a 
good parent who was not deficient in any way. (T.102) He also 
testified that the children would not be harmed in any way if the 
Defendant/Appellant were awarded physical custody of the children. 
(T.103) Lastly, the evaluator testified that his recommendation 
awarding permanent custody to the Plaintiff/Appellee was "a very 
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close judgment call." (T.103) In refusing to award permanent 
custody of the children to the Defendant/Appellant, the trial Court 
clearly failed to follow the mandates of Paryzek. Supra
 r and 
Merriam. Supra. 
There was no compelling reason to change the temporary custody 
situation. However, as noted by the Defendant/Appellant in his 
post-trial Motion for New Trial and Motion to Stay Proceedings, it 
was imperative that the children not suffer another disruption in 
their lives. The trial Court erred in its award of permanent 
custody to the Plaintiff/Appellee. There was neither sufficient 
evidence to support the trial Court's decision nor a convincing 
consideration of the requirement to maintain a stable custodial 
arrangement if possible. The trial Court's decision resolving 
custody is an illogical, specious abuse of discretion. This Court 
should reverse the order granting the Plaintiff/Appellee permanent 
custody. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO AWARD CUSTODY TO THE CHILDREN'S 
PRIMARY CARETAKER. 
A multitude of cases have determined that a trial Court, when 
articulating what type of custodial arrangement will satisfy the 
child's best interest, must closely examine "function-related 
factors." As stated in Schindler v. Schindler. 776 P.2d 84 (Utah 
App. 1989) at page 87: 
"To determine the best interests of the child, the 
trial court must consider "function-related" factors, 
which include: 
the preference of the child; keeping siblings 
together; the relative strength of the child's bond 
18 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
with one or both of the prospective custodians; 
and, in appropriate cases, the general interest in 
continuing previously determined custody 
arrangements where the child is happy and well 
adjusted. Other factors related primarily to the 
primary custodian's character or status or to their 
capacity or willingness to function as parents: 
moral character and emotional stability; duration 
and depth of desire for custody; ability to provide 
personal rather than surrogate care; significant 
impairment of ability to function as a parent 
through drug abuse, excessive drinking, or other 
cause; reasons for having relinquished custody in 
the past; religious compatibility with the child; 
kinship, including, in extraordinary circumstances, 
stepparent status; and financial condition. Id. at 
973 (quoting Hutchison v. Hutchison. 649 P.2d 38, 
41 (Utah 1982). This court has recognized that 
some of the more significant factors, although not 
dispositive, include the identity of the primary 
caretaker during the marriage, the parent who has 
the greatest flexibility to provide personal care 
for the child, and the relative stability of the 
environment each parent is capable of providing. 
Id at 56." 
Subsequent cases such as Moon v. Moon, 790 P.2d 52 (Utah App. 
1990), Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P. 2d 1172 (Utah App. 1991) and 
Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428 (Utah App. 1991) have all 
mandated identification of the primary caretaker utilizing function 
related criteria to formulate a legally cognizable award of 
custody. 
There is no dispute that the Defendant/Appellant provided the 
greater amount of day-to-day care for the children during the 
parties' initial separation. The Plaintiff/Appellee would assist 
in transporting the children to school and back and would assist in 
doing some housework and laundry. (T.30, T.31, T.598, T.60, T.183) 
Her primary, almost sole function, during the final separation was 
to shuttle the children back and forth to school and to make 
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certain that they had eaten something for breakfast. The 
Plaintiff/Appellee testified that during the most recent separation 
she did not cook, clean or do the laundry except infrequently. 
(T.31) As she stated this time she was helping out her husband but 
not caring for him. (T.32) It is tragic that in attempting to 
place the responsibility for the more tedious but critical element 
of caring for the children onto her estranged husband she fails to 
realize that doing household labors for her children is of 
significant benefit to the children and a large part of daily 
parenting. 
The Defendant/Appellant testified that having the 
Plaintiff/Appellee in the home often meant more work for him as he 
would have to clean meals she left behind. (T.123, T.124) The 
Plaintiff/Appellee admits receiving letters complaining of the 
condition in which she would leave the house after her daily 
departures. (T.59) 
The Defendant/Appellant has demonstrated an ability to 
supervise and guide his children. The children have curfews. They 
must have his permission to be away from home and they must inform 
their father of their whereabouts. (T.129, T.130, T.145) If the 
children do not keep their curfews or inform their father of where 
they will be, he grounds them. (T.130) Neighbors, including a 
witness called by the Plaintiff/Appellee, indicated the children 
are well-supervised and cared for by a father who is at home as 
much as possible. (T.ll, T.12, T.178) 
The Defendant/Appellant testified he makes as much effort as 
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possible to be with his children and assist them in all their 
endeavors. He has coached their teams, played sports with them, 
and attended their games. (T.114, T.116, T.161, T.162, T.186) He 
has attended parent-teacher conferences and had additional meetings 
with Adam's teachers because he was concerned about Adam's recent 
academic performance. (T.118, T.119, T.147, T.189, T.190) Both 
parties testified that the Defendant/Appellant assisted the 
children with their homework. (T.60, T.119) The Plaintiff/Appellee 
indicated at trial that the children were not doing as well in 
school as they had been prior to the separation. However, she made 
no attempts to arrange tutoring for the children. (T.49) Mr. Paul 
Brennan, Adam's social studies teacher, testified that he had only 
seen the Defendant/Appellant at parent-teacher conferences. (T.189) 
He perceived the Defendant/Appellant to be a very concerned parent. 
His assessment of Adam was ". . .he seems very stable, happy. His 
scholastic work is exceptional." (T.190) 
The Defendant/Appellant has stated concerns that the 
Plaintiff/Appellee does not adequately supervise the children. The 
Plaintiff/Appellee did not know where Adam was when Commissioner 
Peuler wished to speak to the children. (T.29) The 
Defendant/Appellant testified that he knew of times when the 
children were left alone unsupervised in the home overnight by the 
Plaintiff/Appellee. (T.122) Mr. Tenneson, a neighbor, recalled 
seeing the Defendant/Appellant watching over his children from the 
street at about 3 o'clock A.M. because the Plaintiff/Appellee was 
not home. (T.176, T.177) 
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The Defendant/Appellant demonstrated a willingness and ability 
to spend as much time as possible with his children. The 
Plaintiff/Appellee did not place as much significance on maximizing 
the time she spent with the children. She admitted she spent a 
considerable amount of time during the weekends in Park City with 
her boyfriend. (T.60) During the time the Defendant/Appellant had 
custody of the children during the final separation the 
Plaintiff/Appellee exercised visitation only one or two full 
weekends. (T.126, T.127, T.128) She did not even request to have 
the children with her during Thanksgiving 1991. (161) The 
Plaintiff/Appellee chose to attend a concert at Park City rather 
than attend a softball game on Jamie's birthday. (T.79) Any bond 
between the children and their mother could not have been fostered 
by her elective absences or her failure to spend as much time as 
possible with the children. The apparent increased focus on her 
personal pursuits rather than spending time with the children were 
noted both by the Defendant/Appellant and Mrs. Elma Barnes, the 
children's paternal grandmother. (T.81, T.84, T.85) As the 
Defendant/Appellant stated "She spent more time with them the first 
time and she seemed a little closer to them." (T.126) 
The Defendant/Appellant has demonstrated an ability to discuss 
issues dealing with maturation, responsibility and ethics with his 
children. (T.123, T.125, T.130, T.131) He is a caring, patient, 
competent parent. In contrast the testimony at trial indicated the 
Plaintiff /Appellee was less pcitient with the children and that she 
was also more likely to articulate comments which would cause pain 
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to the childrenand harm their self-esteem, such as calling them 
names, indicating they were couch potatoes and lazy . (T.81, T.84, 
T.125) 
There is not a single function, chore or undertaking the 
Defendant/Appellant did not or would not undertake to meet the 
needs of his children. He clothed, fed, educated and loved them 
during each of the parties7 separations. No one has alleged the 
Plaintiff/Appellee does not love her children. However, her 
functioning as a parent has been much less active and significant 
than that of the Defendant/Appellant. No one even suggested the 
children did not thrive while in the care of the 
Defendant/Appellant. No one ever suggested that the children were 
not happy and well-adjusted while residing with the 
Defendant/Appellant. 
The trial Court completely ignored the parenting, function-
related tasks performed by the Defendant/Appellant when issuing its 
oral decision awarding custody to the Plaintiff/Appellee. Judge 
Frederick stated, "The Plaintiff's level of commitment to her 
children during the course of this separation has exceeded that of 
the Defendant and that's been established by their actions during 
the course of the separation." The failure of the Court to 
properly identify the primary caretaker, to acknowledge the 
Defendant/Appellant's care of the children, and to declare the 
Plaintiff/Appellee to have had a higher level of commitment to the 
children was contrary to the holdings of cases designed to further 
the best interests of children and was contrary to the evidence 
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presented at trial. As a clear abuse of the discretion given a 
trial Court, the trial Court's custody decision should be reversed. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY ADOPTED THE DECISION OF THE 
CUSTODY EVALUATOR WITHOUT PROPER CONSIDERATION OF THE 
FACTS EVIDENCED AT TRIAL. 
Dr. Strassberg failed to make adequate inquiry into past and 
current realities when he performed his custodial evaluation. Dr. 
Strassberg was informed by the Defendant/Appellant of two separate 
occasions when the Plaintiff/Appellee had suicidal ideations due to 
the termination of extramarital affairs. (T.148, T.149) However, 
in his evaluation, Dr. Strassberg discusses only one instance when 
the Plaintiff/Appellee had contemplated suicide. (T.95) 
The Defendant/Appellant testified he informed Dr. Strassberg 
that he believed the Plaintiff/Appellee's interest and ability to 
parent their children had been adversely impacted by her 
extramarital relationships. (T.150) He also indicated that he 
believed the children were upset when they met their mother's 
boyfriends. (T.150) Despite these articulated concerns, Dr. 
Strassberg was unconcerned about the Plaintiff/Appellee's 
extramarital affairs. (T.96, T.97, T.98) This apparent lack of 
concern is antithetical to the statutory mandates of § 30-3-10(1) 
of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended and precedential case 
law which states that a parent's morals are factors which the trial 
Courts must consider in making an award of custody. The custodial 
evaluator was also "unconcerned" that the children would meet the 
man or men with whom their mother was having an affair. (T.97, 
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T.98) It is incredulous that introducing minor, impressionable 
children to their parent's lovers can be cavalierly dismissed as 
having no relevance to the straying parent's ability to assess a 
child's needs and to protect the child from additional anguish and 
trauma or that these introductions will not traumatize children. 
Dr. Strassberg's testimony at trial and his evaluation report 
are inconsistent. He based his recommendation that the 
Plaintiff/Appellee be awarded custody because of the impressive 
level of involvement with the children during the separation. 
(T.103, Custody Evaluation) However, at trial he identified the 
Plaintiff/Appellee's involvement with her children to be ". . . 
getting there early and getting the kids ready for school and was 
often there when the kids got home from school until Steve returned 
from work." (T.99) Later he minimized the efforts expended by the 
Plaintiff/Appellee to parent the children. He stated there was 
very little involved in preparing breakfast for the children. 
(T.99) He was also aware that the Plaintiff/Appellee would "often" 
have the children one day on the weekend. (T.100) The 
Plaintiff/Appellee's concern and love for her children may have 
been genuine but the efforts she expended to parent and have 
contact with her children was minimal. The illusion was a caring, 
committed active parent. The reality was parenting with the least 
possible amount of effort only when it did not involve sublimating 
or delaying the pursuit of her pleasures or inconveniencing the 
Plaintiff/Appellee. It should also be remembered that the 
Plaintiff/Appellee utilized her access to the marital home to 
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remove property which did not belong to her, to go through the 
personal property of the Defendant/Appellant, and to leave dirty 
dishes and messes for the Defendant/Appellant to clean. (T.50, 
T.51# T.59, T.124, T.165) The fatal inconsistencies between the 
conclusion by the evaluator, the evaluator's testimony and the 
facts created and fostered by the Plaintiff/Appellant during the 
separation should have negated any great reliance being placed upon 
the custody report and evaluation. 
The evaluator made no efforts to interview or speak with 
anyone related to the Defendant/Appellant. Several members of the 
Plaintiff/Appellee's family were contacted. (T.93, T.94) Dr. 
Strassberg made no effort to ascertain how much substantive real 
parenting was done by the Plaintiff/Appellee. He made no effort to 
determine why the Plaintiff/Appellee did not exercise more frequent 
or more extended visitation. (T.99, T.100, T.101) The evaluation 
process was flawed. It is only logical that the evaluator's 
recommendation then is also fatally flawed. 
The trial Court is granted a great deal of latitude to 
determine custody. Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 P. 2d 78 (Utah App. 
1989). However, it is not the prerogative of the trial Court to 
automatically adopt the recommendation of the custody evaluator. 
The facts which could have been ascertained by Dr. Strassberg and 
which should have been incorporated in his custody evaluation 
should have properly considered the non-illusionary facts of the 
temporary custody situation and the parenting activities of the 
parties. The failure to do so tainted the evaluation process. It 
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was a clear abuse of the trial Court's broad discretion to adopt 
the recommendations of Dr. Strassberg when the same were not 
substantiated by any credible evidence. It is not within the 
prerogative of the trial Court to adopt flawed analysis or 
untenable, unconscionable recommendations while ignoring 
compelling, often undisputed facts, which affected and defined the 
best interests of these children. The adoption of Dr. Strassberg's 
recommendation and the award of custody to the Plaintiff/Appellee 
should be reversed. 
E. THE AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE 
LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT. 
Paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10 and 14 of the Amended Findings of Fact 
and paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Amended Conclusions of the Law are 
conclusionary, erroneous statements designed only to support the 
trial Court's award of custody to the Plaintiff/Appellee. They 
lack substantiation in the trial transcript. 
The evaluator determined that the Plaintiff/Appellee had the 
emotional stability to be the custodial parent based upon the MMPI 
scores. (T.90) This conclusion is erroneous as the evaluator 
impermissibly disregarded her extramarital relationships, her 
willingness to discuss these relationships with her children, and 
the simple parenting she did in the minimal amount of time she 
elected to give to the children. (T.97, T.99, T.100) The evidence 
by the parties and the witnesses cast unrefuted qualms about the 
Plaintiff/Appellee's fitness, character and emotional stability to 
be the custodial parent. 
Contrary to the assertion in paragraph 8 of the Amended 
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Findings, the Court did not consider the "relative ability of 
parents to provide care, supervision and suitable environment for 
children. . .." Had the Court done so it would not have modified 
the existing lengthy, healthy temporary custody award. This 
allegation is conclusionary and contrary to the preponderance of 
the evidence introduced at trial. 
Roberts v. Roberts. 835 P.2d 193 (Utah App. 1992) sets for a 
very explicit standard for that the trial Court must adhere to in 
issuing legally sufficient Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
"Our threshold consideration on review is whether 
the court's findings and conclusions are adequate. 'In 
cases tried to the bench, the court is required to 'find 
the facts specially' and thus ground its decision on 
findings of fact which iresolved the material factual 
uncertainties and are expressed in enough detail to 
enable a reviewing court to determine whether they are 
clearly erroneous.7 Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 848-49 
(Utah App. 1989) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P.52(a)). '[T]o 
ensure the court acted within its broad discretion, the 
facts and reasons for the court's decision must be set 
forth fully in appropriate findings and conclusions.' 
Painter v. Painter, 752 P. 2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1988) 
(citations omitted); accord Linam v. King, 804 P.2d 1235, 
1237 (Utah App. 1991). These findings must be adequate 
to ensure on appeal 'that the trail court's discretionary 
determination was rationally based.' Painter, 752 P. 2d at 
909 (quoting Martinez v. Martinez. 728 P. 2d 994 (Utah 
1986)). Specifically of findings is particularly 
important in custody determinations. This is so because 
the issues involved are highly fact sensitive. 
We will not disturb a trial court's custody 
determination if it is consistent with the standards set 
by appellate courts and supported by adequate findings of 
fact and conclusions of law. Paryzek v. Paryzek, 776 
P.2d 78, 83 (Utah App. 1989). The legal standards 
applied by the appellate courts are based on Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-10(1) (1989), which requires the trial court 
to consider the best interests of the child and the past 
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of the 
parties.' The appellate courts have emphasized a number 
of 'function related' feictors that are criteria for the 
trial court to consider in determining which custody 
arrangement will meet the minor child's best interests. 
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Unlike support and alimony determinations, which can be 
made by relatively simple quantitative analysis, there is 
no checklist of custody factors, since '[t]hese factors 
are highly personal and individual, and do not lend 
themselves to the means of generation employed in other 
areas of the law,' Moon v. Moon, 790, P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 
App. 1990). Consequently, when custody is contested and 
evidence presents several possible interpretations, a 
bare conclusory recitation of factors and statutory terms 
will not suffice. We must have the necessary supporting 
factual findings linking those factors to the children's 
best interests and each parent's abilities to meet the 
children's needs. See Painter, 752 P.2d at 909. 
[I]f our review of custody determinations is to be 
anything more than a superficial exercise of 
judicial power, the record on review must contain 
written findings of fact and conclusions of law by 
the trial judge which specifically set forth the 
reasons, based on those numerous factors which must 
be weighted in determining the 'best interests of 
the child,' and which support the custody decision. 
Smith v. Smith 726 P.2d 423, 425 (Utah 1986); cf. Ebbert 
v. Ebbert, 744 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Utah App. 1987) (specific 
findings not required when custody is not contested), 
cet. denied. 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
In the instant case, the trial court made two 
conclusions of law referring to its findings, and 
summarized its findings on the custody issue as follows: 
a. That both parties are capable of providing 
care of the minor children. 
b. That both parties have participated in acts 
that bear on their moral character, to-wit: [Wife] 
with the ZCMI incident and [Husband] with the 
incident at the bar. Further, the court finds that 
the incident at the bar did in fact take place and 
that [Husband] was less than candid in his 
testimony given to the court regarding the same. 
c. That [Husband] has physically abused [Wife] 
during the marriage. 
d. That although [Husband] has had custody of the 
minor children since 1990; since that period of 
time is not substantial the court has not given it 
a great deal of weight. 
e. That both parties have a desire for custody 
and a bonding with the children. 
f. That [Wife] was primary caretaker of the minor 
children during the marriage and prior to the 
separation in January, 1990. 
g. That [Wife] is far more amenable to giving 
liberal visitation to [Husband] than [Husband] 
would be to [Wife]. 
h. That [Wife] has better parental skills than 29 
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[Husband] based upon her being the primary 
caretaker. 
i. That it is in the best interests of the 
children that [Wife] be awarded the sole care, 
custody and control of the two (2) minor children 
of the parties. 
These findings are inadequate to guide us in 
assessing the correctness of the court's custody 
determination. The last finding on the children's best 
interests is merely a conclusion of law. From the 
remaining findings, it is impossible to divine how the 
court reached its final legal conclusion. In their 
evidentiary presentations, the parties made much of moral 
character. 'Moral standards' are a statutory 
consideration, Utah Code Ann. § 20-2-10 (1989), and may 
be relevant to a custody determination to the extent they 
affect the children's best interests. See Sanderson v. 
Tryson, 739 P.2d 623, 627 (Utah 1987). However, the 
concept of fault, unrelated to the children's best 
interests, is irrelevant to the custody decision. See 
Mar chant v. Marchant, 743 P. 2d 199, 203 (Utah App. 1987). 
The court's finding on moral character in this case 
states that 'both parties have participated in acts that 
bear on their moral character,' and then proceeds to cite 
specific examples. This statement gives no guidance 
regarding how those acts bear on the parties' parenting 
abilities or affect the children's best interests. Nor 
does it indicate the relative morality of the parties' 
acts, if the specified acts do bear on the parties' 
parenting abilities. The court may be implying that 
Wife's extramarital sexual act in the public parking 
terrace is of equal gravity to Husband's request for 
women's phone numbers at a bar, six months following the 
parties' separation and divorce filing. If so, it fails 
to say so. The court's statement that Husband 'was less 
than candid' renders the finding more problematic. Does 
the lack of candor somehow affect Husband's moral 
character or was the trial court making a credibility 
finding.' If the court was concerned about credibility, 
does this mean that the court did not believe Husband's 
testimony regarding the bar incident or did not believe 
any of his testimony for lack of candor? 
The court may have considered other factors as 
bearing on moral character. If so, it failed to 
enumerate what those other facts were. We believe that 
Husband's abusive conduct toward Wife could be relevant 
to moral character. See Marchant, 743 P.2d at 2093-04 & 
n.3 ('neither this court nor any other court can excuse 
or justify or approve intrafamily violence or spouse 
abuse'). However, the court's sole and conclusory 
finding on abuse, ' [Husband] has physically abused [Wife] 
during the marriage,' is not included in the court's 
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finding on moral character. If the court considered 
abuse or any other factor in its calculation of moral 
character, it should have clearly so indicated. 
Alternatively, the court could have tied its finding of 
abuse directly to the children's best interests by, for 
example, finding a pattern of abuse beyond the one 
culminating incident to which Husband admitted. Absent 
specific subsidiary findings addressing these concerns we 
have no way of knowing on appeal how the court's finding 
on moral character weighs in relation to its scanty 
findings favoring its outcome. Absent factual findings 
specifically setting forth the basis for the court's 
custody determination, we are at a loss to determine 
whether the court abused its discretion in the custody 
award. See Smith, 726 P.2d at 426 ('Proper findings of 
fact ensure that the ultimate custody award follows 
logically form, and is supported by, the evidence and the 
controlling legal principles.'). Thus, we remand for 
more detailed findings. Having made this determination, 
we do not reach Husband's further contention that the 
evidence was insufficient to support the findings and 
that the court abused its discretion in its final 
determination awarding custody to Wife." 
The dicta in Roberts, supra. is unfortunately applicable in 
this matter. The Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
do not refer to any evidence or testimony from this trial which was 
fact specific to this case or which clearly sets forth supportable 
rationale for the trial Court's custody decision. The Amended 
Findings of Fact are also violative of Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. No facts incidental to this particular action 
are cited in the Amended Findings of Fact. However, it is not 
necessary for this matter to be remanded for additional proceedings 
as there is sufficient credible and compelling evidence to reverse 
the trial Court's award of custody to the Plaintiff/Appellee. 
II. THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ALIMONY TO THE PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE. 
It has been long established that the trial Court must find 
sufficient legal reasons to order alimony. In 1985 the Utah 
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Supreme Court reaffirmed the controlling criteria which must be 
satisfied before there can be a proper award of alimony. In Jones 
v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985) at 1075. The Court stated: 
"This Court has described the purpose of alimony: 
'[T]he most important function of alimony is to provide 
support for the wife as nearly as possible at the 
standard of living she enjoyed during marriage, and to 
prevent the wife from becoming a public charge.' English 
v. English 565 P.2d at 411. With this purpose in mind, 
the Court in English articulated three factors that must 
be considered in fixing a reasonable alimony award: 
(1) the financial conditions and needs of the wife; 
(2) the ability of the wife to produce a 
sufficient income for herself; and 
(3) the ability of the husband to provide 
support." 
A multitude of cases decided after Jones, supra, have held 
that a trial Court's failure to consider these three factors is 
reversible error. In Chambers v. Chambers, 198 Utah Adv. Rep 49 
(Utah App. October 21, 1992) Judge Russon for the Court of Appeals 
stated: 
"The trial court is given considerable discretion to 
provide for spousal support, and such an award will not 
be overturned on appeal unless there has been a clear and 
prejudicial abuse of discretion. Paffel v. Paffel, 732 
P. 2d 96, 100 *Utah 1986); accord Rasband v. Rasband, 752 
P. 2d 1331, 1333 (Utah App. 1988). 
In Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P. 2d 84 (Utah App. 
1989), we outlined the facts to be considered by a trial 
court in determining alimony: '(1) the financial 
conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; (2) the 
ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient 
income for him or herself; and (3) the ability of the 
responding spouse to provide support.' Id. at 90 
(citations omitted). 'If these three factors have been 
considered, we will not disturb the trial court's alimony 
award unless such a serious inequity has resulted as to 
manifest a clear abuse of discretion.' Id. (citations 
omitted). Moreover, 'in considering these factors, the 
trial court is required to make adequate factual findings 
on all material issues, unless the facts in the record 
are 'clear, incontroverted, and capable of supporting 
only a finding in favor of the judgment.' ' Haumont v. 
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Haumont, 793 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah App. 1990) quoting 
Throckmorton v. Throckmorton. 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah 
App. 1988), quoting Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 999 
(Utah 1987)." 
The trial Court in this instance failed to consider any of the 
factors enumerated in Jones. supra or Chambers, infra. The 
Plaintiff/Appellee worked a flexible schedule for her employer. 
According to her testimony, she worked between twenty and twenty-
five hours per week. (T.14, T.45) However, both the 
Plaintiff/Appellee and a co-worker who testified on her behalf 
admitted that the option to work full time was available. In fact 
when the Plaintiff/Appellee needed some money to pay attorney fees 
she did work full time. (T.6-, T.8, T.48, T.49) 
The Plaintiff/Appellee did not testify regarding her hourly 
rate of pay at the time of trial. Nor did she provide any current 
information which would verify her present earnings or her total 
year-to-date income. The trial Court utilized the income shown by 
the Plaintiff/Appellee on the Financial Declaration Sheet that she 
had submitted to the Court several months earlier for the 
calculation of child support. (T.133, T.135) There is absolutely 
no indication of what evidence the trial Court utilized to assess 
the Plaintiff/Appellee,s income for the purpose of establishing her 
alleged need for alimony other than her testimony that she would 
guess her monthly earnings were "right around" Nine Hundred Dollars 
($900.00) per month. 
Absent any credible evidence of the Plaintiff/Appellee's 
actual income, the Court had no plausible means of determining what 
the Plaintiff/Appellee's needs were. All the trial Court could 
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possibly have known for certain was that the Plaintiff/Appellee 
believed the mortgage on the parties7 marital home required an 
expenditure of more than half of her gross check, (T.16) 
The Plaintiff/Appellee stated she needed alimony to help with 
the house payment, food and to take care of the children. (T.16) 
The Plaintiff/Appellee did not have a significant amount of marital 
debts to pay as a result of the parties7 division of marital debts. 
Unlike the situation in many divorces, these parties were 
relatively debt free. The only numerical calculation that could 
have been made of the Plaintiff/Appellee's monthly expenses was an 
inflated, speculation of what her monthly expenses might be if she 
were to regain custody which she delineated on her Financial 
Declaration Sheet. There was absolutely no evidence or credible 
testimony as to the Plaintiff/Appellee's realistic monthly 
expenses. It is sheer folly to determine that Plaintiff/Appellee 
needed alimony without any credible evidence of what were her 
actual needs. 
The trial Court did nothing to assess what the 
Plaintiff/Appellee could earn if she were required to work full 
time. The trial Court also failed to determine what the 
Plaintiff/Appellee would earn if income that could be earned by 
working full time were imputed to her even if she were to elect to 
work part time. However, utilizing what the Plaintiff/Appellee 
reported as her hourly rate of pay was, it can be calculated that 
her gross monthly income, computed in the same manner as gross 
monthly income for child support purposes, would be One Thousand 
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Six Hundred Forty-Two Dollars and Sixty Cents ($1,462.60). The 
higher figure should have been utilized in calculating the 
Plaintiff/Appellee's gross monthly income as it is not unreasonable 
to expect the Plaintiff/Appellee to have first maximized her 
earning potential before determining there was a need for alimony. 
The trial court did not, as is required, make any 
determination which is supported by the record on appeal, that the 
Plaintiff/Appellee did not have the ability to produce a sufficient 
income for herself. Rather, the trial court accepted at face value 
the absurd position of the Plaintiff/Appellee that she needed to 
work part time in order to be able to supervise her children. 
(T.16) It had already been demonstrated that the 
Plaintiff/Appellee lacked the ability to adequately supervise her 
children when she was the custodial parent and working part time. 
(T.29, T.121, T.122, T.179) Additionally, all the parties' 
children were in school full time. The amount of time they 
"needed" supervision was minimal. The "need" to work part time in 
order to supervise children, who were not rowdy or troublemakers, 
also ignores the reality of the Defendant/Appellant's ability to 
more than adequately supervise his children while working full 
time. It is likely that most custodial parents of school age 
children work full time. It is not unreasonable to expect healthy 
able-bodied individuals, such as the Plaintiff/Appellee, to work 
full time to support themselves even though for whatever reason 
they would, if they could, choose to work part time. The trial 
Court effectively awarded the Plaintiff/Appellee for expressing her 
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desire to work part time while being punitive to the 
Defendant/Appellant because he, who had no genuine alternative, 
worked full time. The refusal to insist the Plaintiff/Appellee 
accept full-time employment and the refusal to base any initial 
determination of her need for alimony after assessing her ability 
to be self-sufficient as if she had wisely become employed full 
time, whether or not she continued to insist upon the right to be 
underemployed, is clearly violative of controlling case law. The 
Plaintiff/Appellee should hcive been expected to work full time. 
Her ability to produce sufficient income for herself should have 
been viewed as if she accented the option available from her 
employer to work full time. 
The trial Court absolutely failed to consider the ability of 
the Defendant/Appellant to pay alimony. Clearly, the 
Plaintiff/Appellee's choice to work only part time was a luxury 
these parties could not afford. The Defendant/Appellant testified 
at trial that he worked forty hours per week. He was paid Thirteen 
Dollars and Ninety-Five Cents ($13.95/hr.) per hour. (T.131, T.132) 
His 1991 W-2 form was also introduced into evidence (Ex. 1, Ex.2) 
Computation of the Defendant/Appellant's gross monthly income, 
pursuant to the means utilized for calculating gross monthly income 
for child support purposes, unarguably established the 
Defendant/Appellant's gross monthly income to Two Thousand Three 
Hundred Ninety-Nine Dollars ($2,399.00). Had the trial Court even 
calculated the Defendant/Appellant's gross monthly income after the 
deduction of her child support obligation and compared it to the 
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Plaintiff/Appellee's gross monthly income, based upon full-time 
employment, it would have been clear there was no genuine or 
overwhelming disparity in incomes. The Defendant/Appellant's gross 
monthly income after deduction of child support only is One 
Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Five Dollars ($1,835.00). The 
Plaintiff/Appellee's earnings if employed would be One Thousand Six 
Hundred Forty-Two Dollars ($1,642.00). Not only does this proper 
calculation show near parity between the parties' realistic gross 
monthly income, it obliviates any claim that the 
Defendant/Appellant had the ability to pay alimony and the claim 
that the Plaintiff/Appellee had the need for alimony. Now while 
the Plaintiff/Appellee is able to meet her needs, the 
Defendant/Appellant cannot meet his living expenses. The refusal 
of the trial Court to accurately examine the Plaintiff/Appellee's 
need for alimony pursuant to the formula adopted in Jones, supra, 
and ratified in Chambers, supra, was clearly violated. The trial 
Court ignored established, controlling precedent and abused its 
discretion. The award of alimony by the trial Court should be 
reversed. Bell v. Bell, 810 P.2d 489 (Utah App. 1991). 
Neither the Amended Findings of Fact nor the Amended 
Conclusions of Law make any reference to the Defendant/Appellant's 
ability to pay alimony. There is absolutely no mention of the 
Plaintiff/Appellee's ability to provide a sufficient income for 
herself. There is only one conclusionary statement in paragraph 19 
of the Amended Findings of Fact that mentions the need of the 
Plaintiff/Appellee for alimony. Even the oral decision rendered by 
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the trial Court failed to address any facts which would support a 
legally cognizable award of alimony to the Plaintiff/Appellee. 
(T.200). The Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are 
woefully insufficient. Chambers v. Chambers. 198 Utah Adv. Rep. 49 
(Utah October 21, 1992), at page 49, articulated what must be 
contained in final divorce documents to be legally sufficient: 
"This finding is insufficient. See Morgan v. 
Morgan, 795 P. 2d 684, 689 (Utah App. 1990); Johnson v. 
Johnson, 771 P.2d 696, 699 (Utah App. 1989); Marchant v. 
Marchant, 743 P.2d 199, 207 (Utah App. 1987). Contrary 
to the second prong of Schindler. the trial court's 
findings do not address Mrs. Chambers's level of 
education, health, and other matters concerning her 
immediate or eventual employability. Moreover, without 
further explanation, the court's blanket reference to 
'substantial income from assets that have been awarded to 
her7 is inadequate to justify the court's reduction of 
alimony. Without more, we cannot determine whether such 
reduction constituted an abuse of discretion. Lastly, as 
to the third prong of Schindler
 f the court must do more 
than simply state that 'the defendant has the ability to 
pay.' Given the amount of conflicting evidence on these 
facts, the trial court's award of alimony must be 
reversed and remanded for further findings." 
Watson v. Watson, 190 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Utah July 2, 1992). The 
trial Court's award of alimony to the Plaintiff/Appellee must be 
reversed as there is absolutely nothing in the record which 
supports the same. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DETERMINED THE AMOUNT OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S RETIREMENT MONIES 
At trial there was virtually no disagreement between the 
parties as to the amount of retirement monies in existence at the 
time of their separation. They each agreed that the 
Defendant/Appellant had received retirement monies approximately a 
year or more prior to the separation. (T.18, T.140) Each testified 
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that some of the money received had been expended for marital 
purposes prior to the separation. (T.18, T.19# T.140) The 
Defendant/Appellant testified there was approximately Ten Thousand 
Dollars ($10,000.00) of retirement monies when the parties 
separated. (T.140) The Plaintiff/Appellee testified she believed 
there was Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) of retirement monies 
when the parties' separated. (T.19) The testimony of each party 
indicates no disagreement about the amount of the 
Defendant/Appellant's remaining money when the parties separated. 
Additionally, the Defendant/Appellant testified he made 
expenditures from this retirement monies during the pendency of the 
action. (T.140) 
The Defendant/Appellant testified that he had no objection to 
dividing the retirement monies that were in existence with the 
Plaintiff/Appellee. (T.140) His agreement to divide the monies 
existing at the date of trial is in full accord with controlling 
case law. In Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d 1209 (Utah App. 1991) at 
page 1211 the Appellate Court stated: 
"The value of marital property is determined as of 
the time of the divorce decree or trial. Fletcher v. 
Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222-23 (Utah 1980). See also 
Beraer v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985). The 
reason for the rule is that fl[b]y the very nature of a 
property division, the marital estate is evaluated 
according to what property exists at the time the 
marriage is terminated." Jesperson v. Jesperson. 610 
P.2d 326, 328 (Utah 1980). Courts can, however, in the 
exercise of their equitable powers, use a different date, 
such as the date of separation, if one party has "acted 
obstructively,. . ." Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050, 1052 
(Utah Ct.App. 1987). 
Judge Frederick ordered the parties to divide the 
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Defendant/Appellant savings accounts and I.R.A. Accounts. (T.196). 
While still presiding over the trial he further classified the 
division of the Defendant/Appellant's retirement monies to include 
the monies existing at the time of separation (T.200) minus 
expenditures made by the Defendant/Appellant during the pendency of 
the action. (T.201, T.202). The Defendant/Appellant has no quarrel 
with this division. 
After trial the issue of the division of the 
Defendant/Appellant's retirement account again became an issue. 
The Plaintiff/Appellee would not accept the accounting made of the 
retirement monies subsequent to the date of their final separation. 
Counsel for the Plaintiff/Appellee prepared proposed final divorce 
documents which purported to give the Plaintiff/Appellee more of 
the retirement monies thcin were actually due her. The 
Defendant/Appellant filed an objection to the proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. The Court denied these objections. 
On February 26, 1992, the Defendant/Appellant filed a Motion 
for Reconsideration of Unresolved Issues and a supporting 
Affidavit. He verified the retirement monies in existence at the 
date of the parties7 separation and the amounts expended during the 
pendency of the action. By Minute Entry Order March 3, 1992, the 
trial Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration. As a result of 
this erroneous decision the trial Court granted permission to the 
Plaintiff/Appellee to have entered Findings of Fact, specifically 
paragraph 21, and Conclusions of Law, specifically paragraph 15, 
which were factually erroneous and not supported by evidence 
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elicited at trial. The Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law should be deemed legally insufficient and erroneous. The 
ordered division of the Fourteen Thousand Dollars ($14,000.00), the 
amount originally in the Defendant/Appellant's retirement account, 
should be reversed. 
The trial Court's division of the Defendant/Appellant's 
retirement monies as stated in the Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and the Second Amended Decree of Divorce is a 
gross misapplication of the law which resulted in a clear abuse of 
the Court's discretion as well as creating a serious inequity. The 
presumption of the validity of the trial Court's decision as 
referred to in Watson v. Watson, 190 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, (Utah July 
2, 1992) is not present in this situation. As noted in Watson, 
supra, reversal of the trial Court's decision is necessary when 
there is a misapplication of the law. 
"'There is no fixed formula upon which to determine 
a division of properties in a divorce action[.]' Naranio 
v. Naranio. 751 P. 2d 1144, 1146 (Utah App. 1988) 
(citation omitted). We afford the trial court 
'considerable latitude in adjusting financial and 
property interests, and its actions are entitled to a 
presumption of validity.' Jd. (citation omitted). 
Accordingly, changes will be made in a trial court's 
property division determination in a divorce action 'only 
if there was a misunderstanding or misapplication of the 
law resulting in substantial and prejudicial error, the 
evidence clearly preponderated against the findings, or 
such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a 
clear abuse of discretion.' Jd. (citations omitted)." 
Watson, supra. page 44. The parties should be ordered to divide 
the Defendant/Appellant's retirement monies in accordance with the 
accounting he provided the Plaintiff/Appellee and the trial Court. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXECUTING LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT 
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AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
Considerable discussion has been previously undertaken to 
clearly identify the facts which do not support the rulings of the 
trial Court, and which do not substantiate the trial Court's 
resolution of custody, alimony and the division of the 
Defendant/Appellant's retirement monies. The ill founded, 
egregious decisions of the trial Court were further compounded by 
the execution and entry of legally insufficient Amended Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. Read alone without any access to the 
record of the trial proceedings the Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law give not one iota of fact or extrapolative 
rationale to allow any understanding of why the trial Court ruled 
in the manner it did. The Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law violate Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as 
the facts established at trial are not stated specially. 
The Court of Appeals in Woodward v. Fazzio, 175 Utah Adv. Rep. 
70 (Utah December 1991) at page 72 set forth what Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law must do minimally to be legally sufficient: 
"Although the trial court's findings of fact 
constitute a full three* pages of text, they nonetheless 
provide an inadequate account of the actual facts 
supporting the court's ultimate decision. Most of the 
'findings' are conclusory, and reflect an intention to 
merge the trial court's ultimate factual determinations 
with the requirements of the Wuffenstein test, and as 
such are more akin to conclusions of law. See Vigil, 164 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 30. Finding of Fact #7, for instance, 
states that '[appellant's] contacts with the child have 
been inconsistent, sporadic and token,' that 'it is 
evident to the court that the natural Father has 
abdicated his responsibility as a parent,' and that 'the 
court is convinced that the father's conduct has let to 
the destruction of the parent/child relationship.' These 
conclusory statements provide no insight into the 
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evidentiary basis for the trial court's decision and 
render effective appellate review unfeasible. See Adams 
v. Board of Review, 173 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, (Utah Ct. App. 
Nov. 5, 1991). The issue before the court was whether 
Fazzio had abandoned R.A.F.; accordingly, the findings 
should have set forth specific facts—subsidiary facts— 
bearing on that issue. The conclusory statement in 
Findings of Fact #7, 8, 10, and 11 do not provide this 
information and are therefore inadequate. 
Unless the record 'clearly and uncontrovertedly 
support[s]' the trial court's decision, the absence of 
adequate findings of fact ordinarily requires remand for 
more detailed findings by the trial court. Acton, 737 
P. 2d at 999. See also Lovegren, 798 P. 2d at 770-71 
(remand necessary when facts disputed). But see State v. 
Ramirez. 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7, 15 & n.6 (Utah 1991) 
(suggesting same liberalization of Acton's requirement of 
express findings even absent uncontroverted evidence). 
We have canvassed the record in the instant case and 
find disputed evidence, making affirmance as a matter of 
law impossible. Cf.. Lovegren, 798 P.2d at 771 n.10 
(absence of adequate findings is harmless when facts 
concerning an issue are undisputed). There was 
conflicting testimony about the frequency and duration of 
Fazzio's visits with the child, his treatment of the 
child during those visits, Woodward's attempts to prevent 
Fazzio from visiting with the child, Fazzio's payment of 
child support, and Fazzio7s provision of gifts to the 
child—all facts crucial to the validity of the court's 
ultimate decision that Fazzio's conduct had destroyed the 
parent-child relationship. See Adams, slip op. at 8 
('When multiple conflicting versions of the facts create 
a matrix of possible factual findings, we are unable on 
appeal to assume that any given finding was in fact 
made.') 
The trial court's findings of fact should resolve 
these conflicts unequivocally, by stating the specific 
subsidiary facts as the trial court found them. The 
findings should set forth, with as much precision as 
possible, the number of times Fazzio visited the child 
during particular periods; the length of each of the 
visits; the number of visits Woodward intentionally 
prevented; the sums Fazzio provided as child support, 
either personally or through his parents; the number and 
type of gifts Fazzio gave them; and the specific 
statements, acts, or omissions that demonstrate Fazzio's 
intent to either accept or disregard his obligations as 
a parent (e.g., instances of appellant performing child 
care functions like changing his diaper or feeding him, 
denying that the child was his responsibility, etc.). 
Further, the findings should explicitly address the 
impact Woodward's frequent relocation had on Fazzio's 
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ability to maintain contact with the child, the effect 
Fazzio's living and working outside Utah had on his 
visitation, the manner and effect of any refusal on 
Fazzio's part to legally acknowledge his paternity, and 
any other factors bearing on whether Fazzio consciously 
disregarded the child to such an extent that the parent-
child relationship was destroyed. The court's findings 
as to these issues should be set forth specifically and 
should correspond to th€* factual evidence upon which the 
court relied. 
Once we possess this information, we can 
meaningfully evaluate whether the visits have been 
sporadic, the child support payments insufficient, 
Fazzio7s conduct unacceptable, and, ultimately, whether 
Fazzio abandoned the child. Accordingly, we remand for 
more detailed findings by the trial court. 
'We do not intend our remand to be merely an 
exercise in bolstering and supporting the conclusion 
already reached.' Allred v. Allred. 797 P.2d 1108, 1112 
(Utah 1990)." 
Utah's appellate Courts have not allowed insufficient and 
inadequate Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to resolve 
important, fact sensitive issues. This sound policy and precedence 
should not be ignored or abolished. The decision of the trial 
Court should be reversed. 
V. THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S 
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF UNRESOLVED ISSUES AND MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL. 
The trial Court in its ruling at trial ordered the deduction 
of expenditures for legitimate marital obligation from the 
Defendant/Appellant's retirement monies. Implicit in this Order 
was the requirement that the Defendant/Appellant make an accounting 
of the expenditures from these funds. He indeed did provide an 
accounting of the expenditures and validly made to satisfy joint 
marital obligations. 
The Plaintiff/Appellee would not accept this accounting. The 
Defendant/Appellant then sought the assistance of the trial Court 
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to resolve this impasse. Rather than resolving the conflict and 
aiding the parties' to resolve their differences and ensure 
implementation of its ruling the trial Court shirked its duty and 
responsibility and denied the Motion for Reconsideration of 
Unresolved Issues. The Trial Court seriously abused its discretion 
when it denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Unresolved Issues. 
The Defendant/Appellant brought a Motion for New Trial 
pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The 
rationale for the Motion, which sought a rehearing on the issues of 
custody, alimony and division of the Defendant/Appellant's 
retirement monies, was the insufficiency of the evidence to 
substantiate the trial Court's rulings. This Motion, too, was 
denied by the trial Court. 
In yet one more instance the trial Court abused its 
discretion. As stated in Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84 (Utah 
App. 1989) at pages 84 and 85 the appellate Court discusses the 
necessity of trial Court's acting within its discretion and within 
the parameters of applicable rules and controlling case law: 
"The decision to grant a new trial lies largely 
within the trial court's discretion. State v. Brown. 771 
P.2d 1093, 1095 (Ct. App.1989). However, the trial court 
has no discretion to grant a new trial unless the moving 
party shows at least one of the circumstances specified 
in Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Moon 
Lake Elec. Ass'n v. Ultrasysterns W. Constructors. Inc.f 
767 P.2d 125, 128 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). These 
circumstances include, among others, '[a]ccident or 
surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded 
against'; '[n]ewly discovered evidence, material for the 
party making the application, which he could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at the 
trial'; and 'insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision.' Utah R. Civ. P.59(a)(3), 
(4), and (6). So long as such a showing is not made, we 
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will not reverse the trial court's decision on a motion 
for a new trial absent a clear abuse of discretion. 
Brown, 771 P.2d at 1095; Moon Lake Electrical Ass'n. 767 
P.2d at 128." 
Ad nauseam recitation of the facts should not be necessary to 
remind this Court of the rulings of the trial Court which are not 
supported by the evidence or controlling case law. Dismantling a 
viable, stable temporary custody arrangement for no clearly 
articulated reason, requiring a party who could not afford to pay 
alimony to a party who declined to work full time, and declaring an 
excessive value of an asset to be divided are all legally 
indefensible and not even remotely justified by the evidence at 
trial. The refusal to grant a new trial was a clearly improper 
abuse of discretion. The Defendant/Appellant would prefer that 
there be no remand of this matter, but that this Court merely 
reverse the decision of the trial Court, as he believes the delay 
which would be unavoidable while awaiting a new trial could cause 
irreparable harm to his children and seriously jeopardize his 
ability to climb out of the abysmal financial situation in which he 
finds himself. Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744 (Utah App. 1991). 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant/Appellant believes the trial Court repeatedly 
committed reversible error and imposed many manifest injustices 
upon him. He respectfully requests the trial Court's award of 
custody to the Plaintiff/Appellee, the award of alimony to the 
Plaintiff/Appellee and the ordered division of the wrong amounts of 
his retirement monies be reversed. 
The trial Court abused its discretion when it summarily 
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adopted the fatally flawed recommendation of the custody evaluator. 
The trial Court failed to honor its obligation to be the trier of 
fact and consider all the evidence presented it when it adopted the 
recommendation of the evaluator without considering all the 
evidence presented and without making an award of custody premised 
upon the preponderance of credible facts introduced at trial. The 
trial Court, without justification, terminated a temporary custody 
award which provided the children a stable, functional custodial 
situation. There was a total failure on the part of the trial 
Court to identify the best interests of these children and to make 
an award of permanent custody which would meet the existing, 
ongoing and future best interests of the children. The 
Plaintiff/Appellee had in the past given de facto custody of the 
parties' minor children for eighteen months to the 
Defendant/Appellant without making any formal legal claim asserting 
her fitness to be the custodial parent. The Defendant/Appellant 
demonstrated his desire and ability to be the custodial parent 
during each of the parties7 separations. The trial Court 
completely disregarded the Plaintiff/Appellee's unwillingness to be 
a dedicated parent who would exercise visitation at every 
opportunity, assist the children with their homework, attend parent 
teacher conferences, be present at their sporting events, birthdays 
and holidays. The Defendant/Appellant, unlike the 
Plaintiff/Appellee, was able to repeatedly translate his deep love 
and concern for his children into actions which demonstrated his 
love and caring, and which substantiated his ability to identify 
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and satisfy his children's best needs and interests. There is no 
evidence which supports the trial Court's custody award. 
The Defendant/Appellant's net monthly income after the payment 
of his child support and alimony is insufficient to allow him to 
rent an apartment or meet other basic expenses. Yet he is expected 
to work full time to support his children and ex-wife. 
Unaccountably the Plaintiff/Appellee, who had an equal 
responsibility to help support her children and who can be expected 
to attempt to be self-supporting, was not required to work full 
time to meet her financial obligations. The trial Court's award of 
allimony is antithetical to prevailing case law. It is 
unconscionable and untenable. 
The trial Court ordered the parties' to divide an asset which 
neither existed at the time of the parties' separation or at trial. 
The parties agreed that there was Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) 
in retirement monies when th€*y separated. However, the trial Court 
ordered them to divide Fourteen Thousand Dollars ($14,000.00). The 
division of an asset which did not exist is not only irresponsible 
it is clearly erroneous. The trial Court was given evidence by the 
Defendant/Appellant, at trial and in his post-trial matters of the 
amount of retirement monies when the parties' separated, on the 
date of trial and of the expenditures for marital obligations and 
reimbursable expenditures therefrom. The disregard of the evidence 
was a prejudicial abuse of discretion. 
The trial Court executed Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law which neither relied upon the evidence and 
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testimony introduced at trial nor explained the rationale for its 
decisions. It then compounded this abuse of discretion, to the 
detriment of the parties' children and the Defendant/Appellant, by 
its refusal to rectify its errors when it denied the 
Defendant/Appellant's Motion to Reconsider Unresolved Issues, his 
Motion to Stay Its Decision and his Motion for New Trial. The 
trial Court's rulings should neither be afforded the presumption of 
validity, nor the presumption of being well considered, legally 
cognizable or being supported by credible facts, testimony and 
evidence. A reversal and rejection of the trial Court's decision 
is mandated and fervently requested. 
Respectfully submitted this ^OJday of December 1992. 
CAROLYN/pRISCOLL 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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